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Introduction
	 Private	military	and	security	companies	(PMSCs),	or	‘contractors’,	have	replaced	soldiers	and	members	of	
the	armed	 forces	 in	a	variety	of	 situations,	 including	armed	conflict,	prolonged	military	occupation,	
peacekeeping,	and	territorial	administration	in	post-conflict	institutional	building.1）	The	variety	of	functions	
and	cost-performance	of	PMSCs	 to	perform	some	peacekeeping	functions	are	attractive	 to	 the	decision	
makers	of	not	only	 states	but	 also	 international	organizations	 such	as	 the	United	Nations	 (UN).	The	
outsourcing	of	UN-led	peacekeeping	operations	is	now	widely	observed.	Whereas	arguments	of	whether	the	
use	of	PMSCs	in	peacekeeping	operations	are	effective/appropriate	have	been	actively	debated,2）	this	article	






in	 international	 law,	as	a	 frequent	user	of	PMSCs,	 the	UN	must	be	aware	of	 its	possible	 international	
responsibility.	At	 the	 same	 time,	as	an	 international	organization	seeking	 international	peace	and	 full	
protection	of	human	rights,	the	UN	is	in	a	position	to	regulate	the	activities	of	PMSCs.
	 This	article	attempts	to	conduct	a	legal	analysis	of	the	roles	of	the	UN	as	an	employer	and	a	regulator	of	





types	of	 functions	 the	UN	provides	 in	general	 regulation	of	PMSCs,	such	as	providing	a	forum	for	rule	























	 In	 the	post-Cold	War	world,	PMSCs	involvement	 in	peacekeeping	operations	rapidly	 increased.	Three	
primary	factors	fueled	the	growth	of	the	private	military	industry:	a	large-scale	reduction	of	military	forces	
after	 the	Cold	War,	which	created	a	surplus	of	 trained	military	personnel	without	 jobs;	 the	policy	shift	 to	
privatizing	government	services	whenever	possible;	and	an	 increase	 in	 regional	conflicts.5）	The	private	
military	industry	is	now	a	booming	sector	of	the	global	economy,	and	most	PMSCs	offer	a	wide	range	of	
services,	including	peacekeeping	and	peacebuilding.6）	A	comparison	between	the	functions	that	have	usually	















International	has	been	providing	 the	 following:	program	management	and	security;	 recruitment,	 training	and	deployment	of	civilian	
peacekeepers	and	police	trainers;	protection	of	diplomats	in	high-threat	countries;	removal	and	destruction	of	landmines	and	light	weapons;	




 9）	 ECOSOC	‘The	Rights	of	Peoples	 to	Self-Determination	and	its	Application	 to	Peoples	under	Colonial	or	Alien	Domination	or	Foreign	
Occupation’	UN	Doc	E/CN.4/1995/29	(21	December	1994).
10）	 Foreign	and	Commonwealth	Office,	‘Private	Military	Companies:	Options	for	Regulation’	(2002)	London:	The	Stationery	Office	<http://www.






















































problems	 include	 the	 lack	of	effective	 legal	 regulation,	adjudication	and	access	 to	 remedy	 in	cases	of	
wrongful	acts	committed	by	such	private	employees	in	peacekeeping	missions.	The	insufficiency	is	not	only	
theoretical;	in	fact,	some	problematic	behavior	by	PMSC	members	has	been	reported.	It	is	argued	that	because	



































involved	in	at	 least	195	‘escalation	of	force’	 incidents	 in	Iraq	since	2005	involving	the	firing	of	shots	by	
Blackwater	forces.31）
	 These	cases	do	not	mean	that	PMSC	members	are	more	 likely	 to	commit	human	rights	violations,	but	






























































39）	 ECOSOC	‘The	Rights	of	Peoples	 to	Self-Determination	and	its	Application	 to	Peoples	under	Colonial	or	Alien	Domination	or	Foreign	




42）	 See e.g.	Manderlier v. United Nations and Belgium,	Court	of	First	Instance	of	Brussels,	May	11,1966,	81	Journal des Tribunaux No.	4553	
(1966);	Manderlier v. United Nations and Belgium,Court	of	Appeals	of	Brussels,	Sept.	15,	1969,	69	ILR	139	(1969).
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another	UN-related	contract	(UN	Mission	in	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	(UNMIBH)),	was	a	quite	shocking	





















of	 the	Provisional	Coalition	Authority	 immunized	contractors	from	Iraqi	 law.	Under	 the	provisions	of	 the	
Order,	“[c]ontractors	shall	be	 immune	from	Iraqi	 legal	process	with	 respect	 to	acts	performed	by	 them	
pursuant	 to	 the	 terms	and	conditions	of	a	Contract	or	any	sub-contract	 thereto.”	Additionally,	 the	Order	
specifies	“[a]ll	MNF,	CPA	and	Foreign	Liaison	Mission	Personnel,	and	International	Consultants	shall	be	
subject	to	the	exclusive	jurisdiction	of	their	Sending	States.	They	shall	be	immune	from	any	form	of	arrest	or	
43）	 CorpWatch,	 ‘CSC/DynCorp’	<http://www.corpwatch.org/section.php?id=18>	accessed	31	January	2013.	On	2	August	2002	 the	court	












peacekeeping	operations,	with	 the	UN	able	 to	ensure	full	deployment	of	staff.	Therefore,	 the	waving	of	
immunity	 is	not	a	popular	option.	The	comment	by	Julian	Harston,	deputy	special	 representative	of	 the	








	 By	whom	can	 the	wrongful	acts	of	private	contractors	be	 legally	prevented/suppressed,	sanctioned	or	
restituted?	In	the	cases	of	PMSCs	utilized	by	the	UN,	the	first	candidate	would	be	the	UN	itself.	Although	
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(WFP)	and	UN	Development	Program	(UNDP).53）	PMSCs	also	frequently	get	 involved	in	UN	operations	
through	Member	State	contingencies,	which	is	a	particularly	common	practice	as	far	as	the	US	contributions	












Court	used	 the	 term	‘agent’	and	did	not	consider	whether	 the	person	 in	question	had	a	 relevant	official	




whom	it	acts.”	57）	Furthermore,	in	its	advisory	opinion	on	Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process 












57）	 ICJ,	Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations (Advisory	Opinion)	11	April	1949,	177.	See also	ICJ,	Applicability of 
article VI, section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nation (Advisory	Opinion)	15	December	1989,	194.



























firms	contracted	 to	act	as	prison	guards	and,	 in	 that	capacity,	exercise	public	powers,	such	as	powers	of	
detention	and	discipline	pursuant	to	a	judicial	sentence	or	to	prison	regulations,	may	be	considered	an	organ	of	
state.64）	In	contrast,	according	to	the	ICJ’s	finding	in	the Application of the Genocide Convention	case,	a	body	
can	be	regarded	as	a	de facto	state	organ	when	the	body	is	‘completely	dependent’	on	the	state.65）	Although	
PMSCs	are	established	according	 to	 the	national	state’s	 laws,	 they	carry	out	company	management	and	
60）	 ibid.





65）	 ICJ,	Application of the Genocide Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide	(Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	v	Serbia	
and	Montenegro)	Judgment,	ICJ	Rep	2007,	p.	43,	para,	393.
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state	authority	and	 the	 level	of	 judicial	 infrastructure	of	 those	 states.	As	another	option,	 if	 the	UN	 is	
sufficiently	willing,	 it	 is	possible	to	refer	 to	Article	9	of	 the	ILC	Draft	Articles,	which	stipulates	 that	“[c]
onduct	which	is	not	attributable	to	an	international	organization	under	Articles	6	to	8	shall	nevertheless	be	























































76）	 Draft	Convention	(n	69)	Preamble	(at	9),	art	2(i).	It	 is	pointed	out	that,	as	the	listed	activities	include:	 intelligence,	security	and	policing	
application	and	police	powers	and	such	a	wide	definition	seems	to	encroach	on	functions	already	being	performed	by	private	contractors.	It	
will	no	doubt	lead	to	opposition	to	the	Convention	from	states	where	the	PMSC	industry	is	largely	based.	ibid,	138.










	 The	Draft	Convention,	 reaffirming	 that	national	 legislative	efforts	will	never	be	successful	without	a	
coordinated	response	by	the	international	community,	also	provides	various	legal	frameworks	to	lead	states	to	
provide	effective	national	regulation	in	an	integrated	manner	with	other	states.81）	Together	with	the	obligation	
to	 investigate,	prosecute	and	punish	 if	violations	of	human	rights	 law	or	 international	humanitarian	 law	



































[host-country/territory].”	When	 it	 is	 regarded	 that	 the	PMSC’s	staff	was	sent	by	a	 sending	states	as	a	
‘member’	of	a	peacekeeping	operation,	 the	staff	falls	 into	 the	definition	of	a	‘civilian	staff’	and	need	not	
necessarily	be	prosecuted	exclusively	by	the	sending	state.
	 However,	the	intention	to	let	the	sending	state	prosecute	the	members	of	peacekeeping	operations	regardless	
of	 their	status	was	emphasized	in	 the	Security	Council	Resolution	1593,	which	“[d]ecides	 that	nationals,	
current	or	former	officials	or	personnel	from	a	contributing	State	outside	Sudan	which	is	not	a	party	to	the	




	 As	another	option	for	contributing	 to	 justice,	 the	UN	can	cooperate	with	 the	ICC.	Such	a	situation	 is	












88）	 See e.g.	Abu Garda,	‘Decision	on	the	Confirmation	of	Charges’	ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red,	Pre-Trial	Chamber	I	(8	February	2010).
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alleged	perpetrators	of	serious	crimes	are	also	concerned	grave	enough	to	be	tried	before	the	ICC	because	of	
their	role	as	protector.89）
















Security	Council	Resolution	197091）	 and	 further	elaborated	 in	Security	Council	Resolution	1973	holds	






















at	 least	be	regarded	as	an	 indication	of	world-wide	awareness	and	recognition	of	 the	significance	of	 the	
PMSCs	as	an	actor	in	conflict	situation.	However,	it	is	unlikely	that	the	UN	Security	Council	will	take	further	
steps	 in	 regulation	of	PMSCs	because	 the	US	 is	one	of	 the	most	 frequent	users	of	PMSCs	 in	various	
situations.
Conclusion















understanding	and	awareness	of	 the	 importance	of	 the	proper	uses	of	PMSCs,	creation	of	a	clear	 legal	
framework	for	responding	to	legal	grey	areas	still	has	a	long	way	to	go.	It	is	likely	that	use	of	PMSCs	will	
increase	because	the	UN	has	already	found	them	to	be	useful	and	convenient.	Surely,	the	UN	must	be	well	
prepared	for	future	claims	about	taking	responsibility	of	PMSCs’	activities	and	responding	to	international	
demand	for	regulation,	not	only	from	the	states	but	also	from	the	people	directly	affected	by	the	activities	of	
the	PMSCs.
96）	 Liu	(n	94)	314.
97）	 Hin-Yan	Liu,	‘Leashing	the	Corporate	Dogs	of	War:	The	Legal	Implications	of	the	Modern	Private	Military	Company’	(2010)	15	(1) Journal	of	
Conflict	Security	Law,	141.

